Depoe Bay Harbor Fund (FY2019–FY2024) – Financial and Accountability Report

CRITICAL WARNING – SEVEN YEARS OF FINANCIAL FAILURE

The following report is a thorough analysis by concerned citizens of Depoe Bay based on available public data, budget documents, and the limited audit information that exists.

Harbor Fund Operating Financials (FY2019–FY2024)

The Harbor Fund is an enterprise fund supporting Depoe Bay's small marina ("the world's smallest navigable harbor"). It has consistently run operating deficits from FY2019 through FY2024, requiring subsidies from other City revenues each year (1, 2). Table 1 below summarizes the Harbor Fund's operating revenues, expenses, and deficits, along with interfund transfers that were used to offset those losses (figures are approximate, per budgetary and audited data where available):

Fiscal Year Harbor Operating Revenues Harbor Operating Expenses (incl. depreciation) Operating Deficit (pre-transfers) Subsidies/Transfers In Year-End Fund Balance (budget basis)
FY2019 $391,470 (3) $471,648 (budget basis; ~$611k accrual) (4, 5) $(80,178) (6) (accrual net loss ~$219k) (7) $165,000 from General Fund (tourism tax revenues) (8) (budgeted), no Urban Renewal Agency transfer executed (8) $132,445 ending fund balance (modest reserve) (9)
FY2020 $332,166 (10) $607,589 (incl. ~$114.6k depreciation) (11) $(275,423) operating loss (accrual net expense ~$269k) (12, 13) ~$310,000 from Transient Room Tax (TRT) Fund (14); + $316,300 from Urban Renewal Agency (capital project support) (15) ~$4,100 ending balance (essentially broke even after subsidies) (16)
FY2021 unaudited ~$350,000 (est.) (17) ~$600,000+ (est., continued high personnel and maintenance costs) (18) Deficit likely on the order of $250,000 (pattern continued) (19) $310,000 budgeted transfer from TRT Fund (14) (to cover operating loss) Low/near-zero (Harbor maintains minimal cash, reliant on timing of subsidies) (20)
FY2022 unaudited ~$380,000 (est., revenues rebounded post-COVID) (21) ~$600,000+ (incl. depreciation; continued losses) (7) Deficit of ~$200,000 (harbor fees still did not cover costs) (7) ~$75,000 transfer from General/TRT Fund to break even (22, 23); plus small OSMB grants (pump-out station maintenance) Low/near-zero (operated at breakeven with just enough subsidy) (24)
FY2023 unaudited ~$400,000 (est., strong fuel sales & moorage) ~$650,000+ (est., incl. depreciation; initial dock project outlays) Deficit likely >$200,000 (still structurally imbalanced) (25) $244,186 transfer in Adopted Budget (from TRT, planned to subsidize Harbor ops) (26) ~$300,000 projected cash balance (boosted by unspent grant funds carried into next year) (27)
FY2024 budgeted $1.606 million (mostly one-time capital grants) (28) $1.7+ million (including dock replacement outlay) N/A (major capital expenditures planned) $100,000 from Urban Renewal Agency (for Harbor operations support) (29); + Urban Renewal Agency capital placeholder of $1.2 million for docks (30); + $1.5M state legislative grant (capital) (30) $262k–$312k budgeted ending balance (includes carry-forward of grant/Urban Renewal Agency funds for docks) (28)

Key cost drivers: Personnel and basic operating costs constitute a significant portion of Harbor Fund expenses. For example, in FY2019 personnel services were $178k and materials/services $288k, and both categories exceeded their budgets (31). Harbor operations incur fixed staffing costs, routine maintenance, utilities, and periodic dredging and repairs (1). Fuel for resale is a major expense that fluctuates with fuel prices and demand – in FY2019 the Harbor sold ~$248k in fuel, which drove up materials costs since the City had to purchase more fuel inventory (32, 31). Depreciation on harbor infrastructure (docks, seawalls, etc.) is another cost factor, averaging about $110k–$120k per year (33, 11). This reflects the aging capital assets that require replacement or renovation. In sum, even in years of strong revenue (e.g. FY2019 saw record fuel sales and high moorage occupancy), the Harbor's own income has not been sufficient to cover operating costs plus the necessary capital reinvestment (6, 1). The typical annual operating loss (before subsidies) ranged from roughly $200k to $275k on an accrual basis during 2019–2023 (18, 34).

Structural deficits: These operating deficits have been routinely filled by transfers from other funds. In FY2019 the General Fund (bolstered by tourist tax revenues) injected $165k into the Harbor Fund, equal to about 42% of that year's harbor revenues (1, 8). In FY2020, over $300k in support was reportedly needed to keep the Harbor solvent (14). The City budgeted similarly large subsidies (~$300k) in FY2021 (unaudited) and continued smaller support (~$75k estimated) in FY2022 as some revenue streams recovered (14, 35). By FY2023, the City anticipated a ~$244k transfer to the Harbor (from Transient Lodging Tax funds) to cover that year's shortfall – though actual amounts remain unverified (26). Without these infusions, the Harbor Fund would run out of cash – it typically finished each year with virtually no unobligated balance until the influx of grant dollars for capital projects in late 2022–2024 (16, 27). In other words, the Harbor Fund has essentially operated at break-even only because of subsidies, not because it is self-sustaining (2). This structural dependency is discussed further in section 5 (Stakeholder Concerns & Sustainability).

Capital Improvement Projects (Harbor Infrastructure)

Major capital improvements for the harbor were a focal point from 2019 through 2024, chief among them the "Docks 2–4 Replacement" project. This project involves replacing aging docks in the marina and has a multi-million dollar budget spanning several fiscal years (36):

Scope and Budget: The Docks 2–4 replacement was planned as a comprehensive upgrade of a portion of the marina's floating dock infrastructure. It is a multi-year project (FY2020–FY2023) with total costs in the couple-million dollar range (36). For example, the City's FY2022 budget alone included $468,000 for harbor capital outlay related to this project (some of which was not spent until the following year) (36). The project budget is being funded through a combination of state grants, Urban Renewal funds, and local matching dollars.

State Legislative Grant ($1.5 million): In 2022, Depoe Bay secured a one-time $1.5 million appropriation from the Oregon Legislature (secured by Rep. David Gomberg and Sen. Dick Anderson) specifically to support the dock replacements (37, 38). These funds were expected in late 2022 or 2023 and form the backbone of the capital "stack" for the project. The grant is recorded in the City's budgets and financial reports as dedicated Harbor capital revenue (often in a separate capital projects fund). It significantly reduces the direct cost to the City for the dock replacement effort.

Urban Renewal Agency Contributions: The City's Urban Renewal Agency – which can invest in infrastructure within the urban renewal district (encompassing the harbor area) – has committed substantial matching funds. In FY2020, the Urban Renewal Agency transferred approximately $316,300 to the Harbor Fund (15), evidently to initiate capital work on docks or related harbor improvements. This was a transfer of accumulated tax-increment funds into the harbor project. Later, for FY2023–24, the Urban Renewal Agency budget included a placeholder of about $1.2 million earmarked for harbor improvements (30). This indicates that the Urban Renewal Agency is poised to finance roughly that amount of the dock project as matching funds or upfront capital. (Notably, an earlier attempt to use Urban Renewal Agency funds in FY2019 – a budgeted $75k transfer – was not executed, which left a small negative balance in the Urban Renewal Agency project fund until it was corrected (8, 39).)

Grants from Oregon State Marine Board (OSMB): In addition to the big legislative grant, Depoe Bay pursued grants from the OSMB for specific harbor upgrades. The City received Maintenance Assistance Program (MAP) grants of around $6,300 per year in FY2020 and FY2021 to help fund maintenance like the replacement of the harbor pump-out station and fish cleaning station (40, 41). These grants, while much smaller, helped cover essential equipment upgrades that would otherwise come out of local funds. The pump-out station replacement was one such project completed around 2021–2022 with state grant support (40).

Progress and Delays: By FY2023, the City had assembled the funding needed to proceed with the dock replacements, though actual construction was subject to timing and contracting. The FY2023–24 budget included $1.606 million in harbor capital grants (largely the state $1.5M) on the resources side (28), and the Urban Renewal Agency's $1.2M allocation as noted. Some capital expenditures were carried over when not completed as scheduled – for instance, of the $468k budgeted in FY2022 for docks, a portion was unspent and rolled into the FY2023 plan (36). This implies minor delays or timing issues (common with large construction projects and permitting processes). However, by late 2023 the "capital stack" for Docks 2–4 was in place: City officials referenced the Urban Renewal Agency placeholder and the legislative award in budget documents as key to advancing the harbor improvements (42, 30). The project's execution risk remained (it had to be fully contracted and managed), but financially the pieces were lined up.

Other Harbor Projects: Aside from Docks 2–4, the City undertook or planned other infrastructure efforts. Seawall Maintenance is an ongoing concern (the harbor's seawalls protect the marina but require upkeep). In fact, some years ago an internal loan from the Urban Renewal Agency had been used to fund seawall repairs, leaving an obligation on the Harbor Fund's books (43). During 2019–2024 the City was gradually addressing that interfund loan – periodic Urban Renewal Agency transfers essentially helped forgive or pay down the harbor's prior debt on the seawall (43). Dredging is another periodic need: the harbor basin requires dredging to remain navigable. While routine dredging costs show up in Materials & Services, any major dredging campaign would be a significant project (Depoe Bay sometimes seeks federal or state aid for dredging given the harbor's importance). No specific large dredging project is documented in FY2019–24, but maintenance dredging costs contributed to high M&S expenses in some years (5). Finally, harbor facility repairs (gangways, electrical systems, etc.) are addressed as needed. For example, the City replaced a damaged boat ramp in 2020–21 and performed repairs after winter storms – these smaller projects are usually covered by insurance or small grants when possible, or absorbed in the operating budget.

2025 Harbor Dock Completion – Federal/State Funding: The harbor dock replacement project was completed in 2025, financed primarily by $2.9 million in federal ARPA funds and $1.5 million in state appropriations secured by Rep. David Gomberg and Sen. Dick Anderson. This $4.4 million in outside funding was critical, as the harbor's operational losses meant it could never have funded such improvements from its own revenues. The completion addressed long-overdue infrastructure needs but did nothing to resolve the harbor's ongoing operational deficit.

Docks 2–4 Replacement – Funding Summary: In summary, the dock replacement capital project is being financed by a roughly $2.7–2.8 million package: $1.5M from the State Legislature, about $1.2M from the Depoe Bay Urban Renewal Agency, and the remainder from potentially the City's own Harbor funds or other grants. The reliance on external funds is deliberate – Depoe Bay leveraged state and Urban Renewal Agency money so that little would hit the City's General Fund. Execution of this project is critical for the harbor's long-term viability (the old docks were at end-of-life). As of 2024, the project is moving forward with contracts and engineering; any delays have been in aligning funding and contracting, but not due to lack of money at this point. City reports indicate the "capital stack for harbor improvements" is in place and the focus is now on managing construction within budget (44, 45).

Harbor Fund-Specific Audit Findings and Budget Violations

The City's broader audit failures (detailed in the main fiscal report) had direct implications for the Harbor Fund. The FY2019 and FY2020 audits, which resulted in "Disclaimer of Opinion" findings, revealed specific Harbor Fund violations that exemplify the City's financial mismanagement.

Harbor Fund budget law violations (FY2019–2020): In their required Oregon Municipal Audit Law compliance reports, the auditors highlighted that the City over‐expended appropriations in the Harbor Fund in both FY2019 and FY2020. Most notably, FY2019 Harbor personnel services were overspent by $6,290 and materials/services by $64,745 beyond what was legally authorized (31). This is a direct violation of Oregon Local Budget Law, which mandates no department or category can exceed its budget without a council-approved transfer. The FY2019 audit report flagged these over-expenditures as findings, and the City was required to address them in a corrective Plan of Action (per ORS 297.466) filed with the Secretary of State (51). Despite this, in FY2020 the Harbor Fund again overspent its budget (as did at least one other fund), indicating the problem had not been fully corrected (39). Repeating a budget law violation underscores poor financial management. (The Harbor overruns were likely driven by unanticipated costs such as fuel purchases and repairs, as noted earlier, but procedurally the City failed to adopt timely budget amendments (52).) These compliance issues were part of a pattern of legal noncompliance identified in the audits (39).

Harbor Fund financial reporting reliability: Due to the City's internal control failures (see main report for comprehensive audit discussion), the Harbor Fund's reported balances for FY2019–FY2020 could not be fully verified by auditors (49, 53). The FY2020 audit wasn't completed until April 30, 2025 – nearly five years late. For FY2021–FY2024, all Harbor Fund figures are unaudited and self-reported (55, 56), meaning no independent verification of harbor revenues, expenses, or assets for four consecutive years – particularly concerning for the City's most financially troubled fund. As of October 2025, the City still has not achieved a clean audit opinion for any year since FY2018.

Harbor-specific control weaknesses: The City's auditors communicated multiple material weaknesses in internal control, which likely encompassed Harbor operations. For example, cash handling at the harbor (fuel dock sales, moorage payments) was an area of potential risk. The audit reports did not single out harbor cash specifically, but given the Citywide issues, we can infer that standard controls (segregation of duties, daily reconciliations of harbor receipts, inventory controls over fuel) may not have been consistently in place during 2019–2021 (58). Concerned citizens noted that any weaknesses in tracking harbor fees or fuel could lead to revenue leakage or errors if not addressed (58). In response to the chaos, the City eventually hired outside accounting help and began rebuilding its processes in 2025, aiming to restore GAAP-compliant recordkeeping and address the audit backlog (59). But until new audits are completed, the Harbor Fund's financial reliability remains in question. In short, the Harbor Fund was impacted by the City's wider internal control collapse – its budgets were overspent (a symptom of poor control and monitoring), its transactions may not have been properly reconciled, and for several years neither the City Council nor the public received an audited assurance that Harbor Fund financial statements were free of material misstatement. This represents a failure of governance and transparency, as a significant enterprise (the harbor) operated without the normal checks and assurances required by Oregon law and governmental accounting standards.

Grant and Interfund Transfer Activity (Harbor Fund)

The Harbor Fund's finances have been propped up by substantial interfund transfers and enriched by a few key grants during FY2019–FY2024. Below is a chronological summary of major grants received for harbor purposes and interfund transfers into the Harbor Fund:

Transient Lodging Tax / General Fund Transfers: Depoe Bay does not levy a city property tax for general operations; instead it relies heavily on a Transient Lodging Tax (TLT) on tourist accommodations. A significant portion of these tourism-tax dollars get funneled to other uses via the Transient Room Tax (TRT) Fund and General Fund. Supporting the harbor is explicitly one of those uses. Every year, the City budgets a transfer from tourist tax revenues to the Harbor Fund in recognition that the harbor benefits tourism and needs help to cover costs (60, 61). In FY2019, the General/Transient Tax fund transferred $165,000 into the Harbor Fund (8). In FY2020, roughly $310,000 was transferred from the TRT Fund to the Harbor Fund (14) (an even larger subsidy than the prior year, reflecting the harbor's mounting costs). A similar transfer in the amount of $310,000 was budgeted for FY2021 (14), according to city reports, to continue offsetting the Harbor Fund's operating loss. By FY2022, the harbor's revenues had improved slightly (with higher fuel prices boosting income), so the direct subsidy was lower – an estimated $75,000 transfer from the General or TRT Fund was made to keep the Harbor Fund whole (35). In FY2023, the City's adopted budget anticipated approximately a $244,000 transfer into the Harbor Fund (26), likely from the TRT Fund, to cover that year's deficit (this larger amount may also have included some capital match funds). These interfund transfers represent the City effectively routing general revenue (largely tourist tax dollars that could fund other services) into the Harbor enterprise to subsidize its operations. Over 2019–2023, the cumulative support from General/TRT funds to the Harbor Fund exceeded $1.1 million – a substantial internal subsidy for a city of Depoe Bay's size.

Urban Renewal Agency Transfers: The Depoe Bay Urban Renewal Agency, funded by property tax increment in the designated urban renewal area, has also contributed to harbor funding, particularly for capital projects. As noted in Section 2, in FY2020 the Urban Renewal Agency transferred $316,300 to the Harbor Fund (15) to support harbor capital improvements (e.g. dock replacement planning and engineering). This was a one-time infusion separate from the operating subsidies above. The Urban Renewal Agency did not make a similar transfer in 2021 or 2022, but in FY2024 the Urban Renewal Agency budget included a $100,000 transfer to the Harbor Fund to help with harbor-related expenses (29). This $100k in FY2024 appears to be intended for either interim financing of the dock project or additional operating relief as the Harbor Fund took on large capital outlays. In addition, the Urban Renewal Agency has set aside $1.2 million in its project fund for the harbor (as a match to the state grant) (30) – those Urban Renewal Agency dollars will be spent on the dock replacement, though they may be accounted for in a separate capital fund rather than flowing through the Harbor operating fund.

Critical Note on Urban Renewal Agency Transfer Verification: Budget documents suggest Urban Renewal Agency transfers of $316,300 to Harbor (FY2020), $500,000 for water plant, and $1.2 million for docks, but actual amounts cannot be verified due to audit failures. The lack of audited financial statements for FY2021-2024 means these transfers exist only in budget documents without independent verification. As the full report notes, the 2025 harbor dock project was actually funded by $2.9 million federal ARPA and $1.5 million state funds, not the Urban Renewal Agency money claimed in some budget documents. This discrepancy highlights the danger of relying on unaudited City reports.

It's important to note that Urban Renewal Agency funds are restricted to capital projects in the urban renewal area; using them for harbor infrastructure is allowable (since the harbor is within the Urban Renewal Agency), but using them for day-to-day operating losses is generally not the Urban Renewal Agency's purpose. The $100k in FY2024 for "operations/capital" suggests the City found a way to justify that transfer under project-related needs (possibly covering project management or preliminary costs).

State and Federal Grants: Aside from the $1.5 million legislative grant (which is effectively a state capital grant) (37), the Harbor Fund benefitted from a few smaller grants:

Interfund Loans and Other Transfers: Within the City's books, there were also minor interfund transactions involving the Harbor. The Harbor Fund sometimes transfers small amounts out to the Water or Sewer Funds to pay its share of utility costs or shared staff. For instance, in FY2019 the Harbor Fund transferred $3,000 to the Sewer Fund and $6,200 to the Water Fund for these purposes (62). These amounts are relatively trivial. More notably, the Harbor Fund in past years had an internal loan obligation to the Urban Renewal Agency (from an old seawall repair project). This showed up as a negative fund balance in the Urban Renewal Agency Project Fund of about $4,000 in 2019 (43). The City has been gradually "forgiving" or repaying that internal loan, such as via a portion of the Urban Renewal Agency transfers mentioned above. By 2024, that old balance was largely resolved, cleaning up the interfund debt.

Transparency of Transfers: All the major transfers and grants are documented in the City's budget resolutions and, when audits occurred, in the financial statements. However, the lack of timely audits obscured some of this activity from easy public view. The concerned citizens group noted the importance of tracing these subsidies, as the Harbor Fund's appearance of breaking even each year was only achieved by infusions from the General Fund (tourism taxes) and Urban Renewal Agency (63, 64). In essence, the Harbor Fund has been kept solvent through a combination of local tax transfers and outside grants. The City's strategy has been to leverage external funds (state money, Urban Renewal Agency taxes) wherever possible, so that the harbor's burden on the General Fund is minimized – but even so, well over $200k per year of local money on average has been diverted to harbor support during this period.

Stakeholder Concerns and Oversight Commentary

Depoe Bay's management of the Harbor Fund – and its finances in general – attracted increasing scrutiny from both oversight authorities and local stakeholders in 2019–2024. Public concerns have centered on mismanagement, lack of transparency, and the sustainability of subsidizing the harbor. Oversight agencies at the state level intervened due to the City's audit failures, indirectly highlighting issues like the Harbor Fund's deficits. Key points include:

State oversight impact on Harbor funding: The City's audit delinquencies (detailed in the main report) resulted in the state withholding 10% of certain state-shared revenues (65), directly reducing General Fund resources available to subsidize the Harbor. While these funds were eventually returned in 2023 (66, 67), the penalty period constrained the City's ability to support harbor operations.

Harbor Fund Sustainability – Local Warnings: City officials themselves have at times acknowledged the Harbor Fund's structural dependency on subsidies. In budget messages and financial condition reports, the Harbor's operating deficit is flagged as a key risk to the City's finances (69). For instance, an independent financial report in 2024 noted the harbor's "dependence on subsidies" and warned it "needs close monitoring" to ensure long-term sustainability (70). The City's Budget Committee has openly discussed how harbor operations do not pay for themselves and rely on transient lodging tax transfers. Some council members and citizens worry that this is an ongoing drain on the City's resources – funds used to cover harbor losses could otherwise go to other city services or reserves (71, 72). If tourism revenue (the source of the subsidies) were to decline in a recession or if political will to subsidize the harbor wanes, the harbor could quickly fall into financial crisis. In short, the harbor's fiscal impact on the City is that of an "expense center" requiring general support, year after year (64). As a tourism and economic asset, the harbor is valued, but from a purely budgetary view it has been an ongoing liability that the City must manage.

Public concern about Harbor subsidies: The Harbor Fund's chronic losses and need for regular transfers have become a focal point of public concern about the City's financial management (see main report for broader governance issues). Citizens and media have specifically questioned the sustainability of continuing to subsidize harbor operations at current levels, particularly given the lack of transparent financial reporting that would allow proper scrutiny of harbor expenses and revenues.

Harbor Fund as accountability test case: The Harbor Fund's condition will be a critical focus when audits of FY2021–2024 are eventually completed. State observers and grant-givers (including the Marine Board and legislators who provided the $1.5M dock grant) require assurance that harbor grant monies are properly accounted for. If audits reveal continued losses despite large grants, it will reinforce questions about the harbor's operational model and the need for structural changes beyond continued subsidies.

Mayor's admission of financial chaos: The depth of the City's financial dysfunction was starkly revealed when Mayor Kathy Short admitted: "We have money in the bank, but we can't do any reports to actually balance any of our funds." This extraordinary admission confirms that despite having cash reserves, the City cannot verify the actual status of individual funds, including the Harbor Fund, due to the complete breakdown of financial reporting systems.

2025 Harbor Fee Crisis: The Harbor Fund's structural deficit reached crisis levels in 2025, prompting emergency measures. In March 2025, the City Council approved a new craft storage fee to address an $85,000 shortfall that was being covered by the general fund (primarily from transient lodging fees). By May 2025, discussions revealed the true extent of the problem: the harbor required approximately $250,000 in annual subsidies from the City. This led to dramatic fee increases: the fuel surcharge more than doubled from $0.61 to $1.34 per gallon (a 120% increase), and a new $250 crab pot storage fee was implemented. Local boaters expressed outrage at both the increases and the lack of transparency in how these fees were calculated. Despite receiving $4.4 million in federal/state funds for harbor improvements in 2025, the City still demanded these emergency fee hikes.

Fiscal impact on the City's overall condition: In summary, the Harbor Fund has had a significant impact on Depoe Bay's overall finances in this period – it has been an ongoing net user of resources. Each year, six-figure subsidies have been channeled from general revenues (especially transient lodging taxes) into the Harbor Fund to cover operating shortfalls (64). While the City's General Fund was strong enough to absorb this (thanks to booming tourism revenue in recent years), it effectively means the City has less flexibility to fund other services or build larger reserves. The opportunity cost of supporting the harbor is high. Importantly, the City's liquidity remained healthy through 2024 (cash balances were robust (77, 78)) so the harbor's losses never caused a cash crisis – but they did erode what could have been even stronger fund balances. From a long-term sustainability perspective, current practices do not indicate that the Harbor Fund will become self-sustaining under status quo. The City has acknowledged that without continued external support the harbor cannot cover major maintenance or capital needs (79, 2). The concerned citizens' analysis concurs: the Harbor Fund is structurally in deficit and essentially "stable" only so long as subsidies continue (2). If tourism-tax revenues were to dip or if the City faced other financial emergencies, the harbor could quickly run into trouble. On the positive side, the City's approach of aggressively seeking grants (like the $1.5M dock grant) and using URA funds for harbor infrastructure has reduced the burden on the General Fund in the short term (37, 30). However, those are one-time infusions for specific projects. Once the new docks are built, the ongoing operations will still likely run at a loss absent significant changes (e.g. substantial moorage rate increases, outsourcing of marina operations, or finding new revenue streams). City officials have begun to discuss strategies such as incremental fee increases (a 3% annual CPI-based moorage fee hike was implemented starting in 2021) (17), but small tweaks are unlikely to close a $200k/year gap. A more comprehensive plan – potentially reallocating a fixed portion of tourism taxes permanently to harbor operations, or endowing a "harbor reserve" fund when times are good – may be needed to ensure long-term sustainability. As recommended in the FY2023–24 Citizen's report, Depoe Bay should "maintain a formal harbor capital financing plan" tied to grants and matches, and continuously monitor the harbor's performance as a key risk area (80).

Sources

All data and citations in this report are drawn from official City of Depoe Bay financial reports, state audit records, and credible analysis documents. Key sources include Depoe Bay's FY2019 and FY2020 audited financial statements, FY2019–FY2022 concerned citizens financial condition analyses, the City's FY2023–24 financial condition report, Oregon Secretary of State audit notices, and urban renewal budget documents. Specific reference details are provided in-line above in the format (source document†line numbers) for verification. (81, 82)

Primary Source Documents

Financial Condition Analysis Reports Referenced

(1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 31, 32, 33, 48, 51, 52, 62, 71, 72) Financial Condition of the City of Depoe Bay (FY2019)

(2, 25, 26, 27, 29, 49, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 69, 77, 79) City of Depoe Bay – Fiscal Year 2023 Financial Condition Analysis

(5, 7, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 74, 78) Financial Condition Analysis – City of Depoe Bay (Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2022)

(10, 11, 12, 15, 34, 41, 46, 63) Financial Condition Analysis – City of Depoe Bay (FY ending June 30, 2020)

(13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 40) Financial Condition Analysis – City of Depoe Bay (FY Ended June 30, 2021)

(28, 30, 42, 44, 45, 80) Depoe Bay FY2023-24 Financial Condition Report

(39, 47, 50, 54, 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82) City of Depoe Bay Fiscal Failures and Audit Noncompliance Report: FY2019–FY2024

VIEW DEFINITIONS